Banyan: Fighting monsters | The Economist

Banyan: Fighting monsters | The Economist

Fighting monsters

Political outsiders are challenging Asia’s traditional elites

Sep 29th 2012 | from the print edition

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A NEW force is emerging in Asian politics: the non-politician—or at least the politician posing as such. In South Korea the campaign for the presidential election in December has been shaken up by the new candidacy of an independent, Ahn Chul-soo, a former doctor turned antivirus-software tycoon. In Japan the new Japan Restoration Party (JRP), founded by Toru Hashimoto, the 43-year-old son of a small-time gangster who has risen to be mayor of Osaka, scores higher in some opinion polls than the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). In Jakarta Joko Widodo (known as Jokowi), who ran a furniture business before he became mayor of Solo in central Java, is certain to have defeated the ruling party’s incumbent in the September 20th election for governor of Jakarta (official results are expected soon).
In Pakistan the most talked-about candidate in parliamentary elections due in the next six months is Imran Khan, a former cricketer. South Asia has seen many film stars and sportsmen trade their popularity for votes. But Mr Khan, unlike them and like Mr Ahn, Mr Hashimoto and Jokowi, presents himself as an outsider campaigning for a new sort of politics. Elsewhere, some outsiders are transforming politics without even running for election. In India the anti-corruption demonstrations and hunger-strikes led by Anna Hazare for a while dictated the terms of the national political debate. Similarly, in Malaysia, the government has at times seemed more worried by Bersih, a campaign for electoral reform led by Ambiga Sreenevasan, a lawyer, than by the formal opposition.
Three factors unite these very different insurgencies. The first is the failure of seemingly closed, and often dynastic, political leaderships to renew themselves. Indonesia’s most recent presidential election was in 2009, more than a decade after the end of the Suharto dictatorship. But among the candidates were the daughter of the president who Suharto ousted in 1965, Suharto’s former son-in-law and two other generals from his time, including the victorious incumbent, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Pakistan’s two big parties are family-run conglomerates.
In South Korea Park Geun-hye, the ruling party’s presidential candidate, is the daughter of Park Chung-hee, who seized power in a coup in 1961 and ruled until his assassination in 1979. This week Ms Park apologised for abuses during his rule, which was marked by spectacular economic advance, but fierce political repression. Facing a tough challenge from both Mr Ahn and the opposition candidate, Moon Jae-in, Ms Park took the awkward step (especially in a Confucian society) of repudiating her own father.
A second common factor is rage against corruption. In Solo Jokowi was famous for mundane but effective schemes for curbing graft, such as “one-stop shops” for business permits, where uniformed civil servants conduct their business in full view of the public. This replaced an expensive paper trail through murky offices. Imran Khan promises to end “all major corruption” within 90 days of taking office. South Korea’s politicians are widely seen as in the pockets of the chaebol, the big conglomerates. Japan’s stagger from one party-finance scandal to another.
Third, these are insurrections of the social-media generation. Their typical activist is young, urban, educated and has hundreds of Facebook friends. The internet and mobile technology enable non-politicians to do without big party organisations to spread the word. And in politics, as with funny clips on YouTube, new enthusiasms can spread like wildfire.
Broadly, the advent of all these upstarts is to be welcomed. Mr Khan and Mr Ahn have excited young people cynical about politics. In Jakarta Jokowi already has one hugely positive achievement to his name. His running-mate for vice-governor, Basuki Tjahja Purnama, known as Ahok, is an ethnic-Chinese Christian. Conventional wisdom had it that such a man could not win an election in Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority country. His opponent’s campaign muttered about “infidels”. So the victory for the Jokowi ticket was also a triumph for tolerance and civilised values.
Mr Hashimoto is harder to like. He may have admirable ideas for reform, but his right-wing populism plays down the cruel abuses of Japan’s imperial past. At a time of tension with China and South Korea, this is dangerous as well as wrong. But on a political stage peopled by interchangeable nonentities, Mr Hashimoto’s entry has had a galvanising effect. He deserves credit for showing that political enthusiasm is still possible in Japan.
The farther they are from power, the more attractive insurgents tend to look. As they approach office, they are forced into sometimes grubby compromises with the forces of the establishment they purport to despise. This is a particular problem for Mr Khan, and for Jokowi if he aspires to national office (and many hope he does). In Indonesia and Pakistan national electoral success depends on getting out the vote in the countryside. And that requires old-style politicians with local clout and organisation.
The outsider’s dilemma
Mr Khan has recruited just such supporters from the big parties. He also suffers from the widespread suspicion that he has the backing of the “establishment”, the euphemism which many Pakistanis use for the army and intelligence services. Even if untrue, this is understandable. The army has a history of backing politicians who might sap support from the two big civilian parties. In Jakarta Jokowi was backed by two mainstream parties. Mr Hashimoto’s JRP has defectors from the DPJ and others. In South Korea Mr Ahn risks splitting the anti-Park vote with Mr Moon. To defeat her, he may either have to withdraw and play kingmaker, endorsing Mr Moon, or become the opposition’s official candidate. To fight political monsters, even maverick heroes may have to become monsters themselves, alienating some of the very idealists they hoped to represent.
^{Economist.com/blogs/banyan}

U.S. Aid and Egypt: It's Complicated - Sada

U.S. Aid and Egypt: It's Complicated - Sada

U.S. Aid and Egypt: It's Complicated

October 23, 2012 Thalia Beaty

  

On September 28, the Obama administration notified Congress that it would release $450 million in budget support funds to Egypt. The funds were part of $1 billion in debt relief for Egypt that the president announced in May 2011. The funds are not actually new foreign assistance or taxpayers’ dollars, but rather reallocations from regularly scheduled debt payments that Egypt already makes; instead of depositing them to the U.S. treasury, the funds are being allotted to support Egypt’s economy in this time of transition.
Debt forgiveness is one of several creative responses that the administration has utilized in last two years; the United States used almost $800 million in (mostly) already allocated funds to support civil society groups, elections administration, the formation of political parties, and direct budget support to the emerging governments in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. But while a plan for how entire $1 billion in debt forgiveness has not yet been finalized, the $450 million is meant to signal U.S. confidence and pave the way for Egypt’s agreement with International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a loan—negotiations which have been ongoing since March. Egypt will need to outline a plan to decrease its budget deficit in order to secure the IMF’s $4.8 billion loan, and the Obama administration has pledged to disperse another $260 million when the agreement is finalized before the end of the year.
But the plan to allocate $450 million of the $1 billion in debt forgiveness to support Egypt’s budget has not been welcomed in all quarters, with some balking at the idea of funding the country’s new Muslim Brotherhood-led government. Representative Kay Granger, who heads the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, pledged immediately that she would prevent the fund’s release; two days later, Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Jim Jordan demanded to know whether the Obama administration meant to support the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power in Egypt, saying: “It is critical that these extremist groups [the Muslim Brotherhood] are not permitted to hijack the transition process and impose a new kind of totalitarianism in Egypt; if they do, the United States should not be funding them.” In response, the State Department has dispatched its own officials to Congress to assert the importance of aiding Egypt’s transition.
In examining U.S. assistance to Egypt, the United States will need to confront some uncomfortable truths about the militarization and inflexibility of American foreign policy in Egypt. To see U.S. foreign aid as a faucet that should turn on and off when the Egyptian government steps out of line with U.S. policy is fundamentally incorrect both in terms of how aid works—particularly in the current world economy—but also in terms of its understanding of the nature of the U.S.-Egypt relationship. There are significant institutional contacts between the two governments that are important to maintain for both parties. But considering the language of celebrated “joint accomplishments,” mutual interests, and studied agreement that is often employed, the U.S.-Egyptian partnership has delivered remarkable mediocrity and should be reevaluated.
Since Egypt signed the treaty with Israel in 1979, it has become the second largest recipient of foreign assistance from the United States after Israel. Economic support funds (ESF) were initially poured into large-scale infrastructure projects, as well as ventures in health, education, judiciary training, and democratization. As Egypt’s economy grew, however, both sides wanted to redefine the arrangement and focus on trade rather than assistance, leading to a decrease from $800 million a year in 1999 to $250 million per year in 2009 as a result of an agreement. To this end, the Bush administration opened negotiations on a free trade agreement in 2003 (later indefinitely postponed).
Despite this legacy of intergovernmental cooperation that has stretched over three decades, there is a palpable acrimony between the two governments. The Egyptian government—under Mubarak and presently—historically has chafed at the United States’ constraints on aid—particularly its direct funding of civil society organizations. In 2003,  the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) was created to give support directly to local civil society groups across the Middle East and North Africa. In Egypt, the Ministry of International Cooperation (most recently led by Fayza Abul Naga, who advocated for the arrest of foreign and Egyptian NGO employees this past April) took great offense at any funding going to groups in Egypt without governmental knowledge and consent. Former President Mubarak himself rebuffed calls for greater political competition during the 2005 presidential elections, and imprisoned Ayman Nour, the first candidate to contest a presidential election. As a result, the United States ended its nascent discussion of a U.S.-Egyptian free trade agreement. Since Mubarak’s ouster, Congress placed similar constraints or restrictions on military aid by making the delivery of funds contingent on Egypt’s Supreme Council of Armed forces handing over power to civilian rule.
In short, while both sides professed to agree on the desirability of moving away from foreign assistance toward increased U.S.-Egypt trade, there has been little tangible movement to reform the mechanisms of U.S. economic assistance. The cause is in part, that the Egyptian government feels that constraints put on aid are redundant; Egypt feels that its obligation is to uphold the peace treaty with Israel and maintain the privileges that it affords the American military—most importantly, prioritized U.S. access to the Suez Canal and flyover rights. It is unlikely that the American military would want these put on the bargaining table for review. Conversely, Egypt uses its military aid to purchase equipment, support, and training from American companies—benefitting weapons manufacturers across the United States
In the administration’s proposed budget for fiscal year 2013, it requested $770 million for a new program, the Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund. The fund invites regional governments to apply for funding to support reforms in three areas: political participation and independent civil society, security and justice reforms, and the promotion of regional trade. This kind of incentive funding is unprecedented, and is supposed to award proposals from regional governments based on the applying government’s commitment to reform, the likelihood of implementation, and the strategic interests of the United States. Instead of allocating money to each country (as in bilateral aid), theoretically this multi-country fund will reward the most serious reformers in the region and shame the recalcitrant.
There are a couple of catches, however. Congress has to approve the incentive fund, and presently, the House of Representatives has allocated nothing to fund it; on the other hand, the Senate’s version of the budget awards the incentive fund $1 billion—much more than what the president requested. There is also the question of whether the fund will actually function as an incentive, especially as the older bilateral assistance agreements are still in place. In order to be effective, the State Department will need to actually reward reformers—not just the governments that are strategically important. If Congress’ previous attempts to constrain aid are any indication, the provision that allows strategic interests to determine allocation may only reinforce the status quo rather than incentivizing reform. And while it seems reasonable to assume if the incumbent administration is reelected in November that Congress will fund his request, it is certainly not guaranteed.
The take away from all this should not be that the relationship is unchangeable or that it cannot be rescued. U.S. aid to Egypt requires a deeper re-examination, not only in mechanism but also in purpose. The first step, though, is to recognize that the United States with the Egyptian elite crafted 30 years of unequal policies, of institutionalized torture, of impunity for the wealthy, and of deep distrust between government and citizen. It is time for the U.S. to move away from focusing support largely on helping stabilize and back friendly regimes (as was the case with Mubarak regime and others across the region) and toward finding real mutual interests to pursue with the emerging governments. 
Thalia Beaty is the Egypt and North Africa editor for Muftah.org. 
* Editor's note: An earlier draft of this article was mistakenly published on October 23, 2012. The editors apologize for the inconvenience.

Exclusive cartoons from the Afghan mujahideen- By Matthew Trevithick | Foreign Policy

The Not-So-Funny Papers - By Matthew Trevithick | Foreign Policy

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The Not-So-Funny Papers

Exclusive cartoons from the Afghan mujahideen.

BY MATTHEW TREVITHICK | OCTOBER 26, 2012

Matthew Trevithick

26 / 29

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Above, a cartoon titled "Babrak's School" shows Karmal reading communist literature to a classroom full of irritated students. On the blackboard -- across from the portrait of Vladimir Lenin -- "Islam" and "communism" have been written, with a check mark next to communism and an incorrect mark next to Islam. During the occupation, the Soviets undertook massive literacy campaigns across Afghanistan, and some of the largest protests against their presence were precipitated by efforts to teach women how to read.

Is the Obama campaign taking commercial ideas from Vladimir Putin? | FP Passport

Is the Obama campaign taking commercial ideas from Vladimir Putin? | FP Passport

Is the Obama campaign taking commercial ideas from Vladimir Putin?

Posted By Joshua Keating Thursday, October 25, 2012 - 4:14 PM  

I see the Obama campaign has a new YouTube ad featuring Girls star (and fellow Oberlin alum!) Lena Dunham:

"Your first time shouldn't be with just anybody. You want to do it with a great guy," she says, referring to casting your first ballot for Obama. (What were you thinking?)
It's a clever conceit, but feels a bit familiar. Perhaps because the same joke was used in an ad for Vladimir Putin's presidential campaign earlier this year:

A suggestive ad rallying support for Putin's presidential campaign shows a young woman seeking a fortune-teller's advice. "Let's find out, cutie, who is intended to you by destiny," the mystic says. The girl replies, "You know. I wish it to be for love -- It is my first time."

Here's that one:
Another ad from the same campaign featured a doctor telling a young woman, "The main thing is to be sure it's safe. Especially the first time."
Let's just hope the campaign doesn't delve further into the Putin catalog.
Update: Looks like Reagan may have beaten Putin to this joke by a few years. 
Also, whether you like the Dunham commercial or not, describing it as "further proof we live in a fallen world destined for hell fire" is um... going a bit far.  

A Short History of World War III - By Michael Peck | Foreign Policy

A Short History of World War III - By Michael Peck | Foreign Policy

A Short History of World War III

I lost the Cuban Missile Crisis and nuked the world from my couch ... and you can too.

BY MICHAEL PECK | OCTOBER 26, 2012

Come closer to the fire, my friend. It will keep the chill of nuclear winter away. Are you hungry? I have some canned food that is not radioactive. I checked it with a Geiger counter myself.
You came here from Washington, D.C.? I have heard rumors of strange creatures living among the ruins. Ground Zero was the White House, and I am told that a peculiar blue light glows from the bottom of the crater.
But people tell many stories. You have traveled a long way, and I will tell you the story you came for. You desire to learn how World War III started? I will teach you with the help of a friend. A board game called Cuban Missile Crisis. Perhaps you will make better decisions than Kennedy and Khrushchev did.
Help me set up the map. You see the island of Cuba, long and narrow like one of Castro's cigars, and divided into hundreds of hexagons? There are two players, one controlling the Soviets and Cubans, and the other for the Americans. Let us now place the little cardboard pieces. Now you see the prime cause of the war. Lack of information.
Do you notice that like the game of Stratego, the Cuban and Soviet forces set up face down, so that the Americans only see a hundred or so faceless brown pieces across the map? Each piece might be a Soviet medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) battery. Or a surface-to-air missile (SAM) unit, or a rather inconsequential Cuban Army battalion. The Americans can only scan a sea of anonymous brown until their reconnaissance aircraft overfly a hexagon and flip the pieces to their revealed side. Until then, they can't bomb missiles sites that they can't spot.
How thick the fog of war is, as dense as a mushroom cloud. There are also Soviet convoys that arrive during the course of the game. They have their true nature hidden on the back side unless the American Navy intercepts them. Some carry regular cargo, but others carry intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). And to make the fog truly opaque, the Soviets secretly roll dice to determine when the missiles in Cuba become operational, so the gringos don't even how much time they have to remove the missiles before they can be fired.
Now we set up the Americans. The game begins October 16 -- each turn equals one day -- and the United States only has a few air squadrons in south Florida until mobilization is declared. Unlike the Soviet side, the American pieces are always face-up and known.
Would you like some crackers?  I found them in a fallout shelter. They are dry but nutritious. Where was I? Ah, yes, now comes the heart of the game. Each side has a deck of event cards that it can choose to play, one per turn. Many cards can only be played at higher alert levels, which span Defense Condition 1 to 5 for the United States, and a state of Peace, Crisis, and War for the Soviets. Each card allows certain actions, and adds or subtracts victory points for the United States or the USSR.
At the start of the game, the Americans start at a relaxed Defcon 5 and the Soviets at Peace. Neither side can attack each other, and America can fly only one reconnaissance mission each turn turn. If only things had remained that way...
Keep your hand away from that green blob on the floor. I swear that I have seen it move at night. Now we begin the game:
It is October 16. It was a Tuesday, I think. I was going to surprise my wife with a ... no, best not to think too much of the past. The present is hard enough. But it is the first day of the crisis, and the Americans move first. They change their alert level to Defcon 4, which allows them to play the Increased Reconnaissance card that allows two overflights per day. The reconnaissance aircraft detect some SAM sites, some Mig fighters and Ilyushin bombers, and a medium-range ballistic missile site. The MRBM site is not yet active, but now President Kennedy has proof of Soviet missiles!
The Soviet response is to raise their alert level from Peace to Crisis (as if there wasn't a crisis already?) -- and play a Cuban Mobilization Card to strengthen local forces in case the Americans launch a ground invasion.
October 17. Perhaps some quiet negotiation could have averted tensions at that point. But the Americans order Defcon 3. They play a Low-Level Reconnaissance card to improve the results of their overflights. Another MRBM site is detected, plus more SAMs and a Soviet mechanized regiment.
The Soviets did not play a card that day. Perhaps they thought time was on their side. They would wait out the Americans until the missiles were operational and then be in a much stronger bargaining position.
Have some water. I apologize for the quality. I filter it as best I can, but the black rain gives it the texture of mud.
October 18. Two Soviet cargo ships arrive that day. They were actually carrying food and industrial machinery, but how was Washington to know that? The Americans maintain Defcon 3, but now they play U.S. Army Mobilization. For the next several days, so many troops and aircraft pour into Florida that the state nearly sinks into the ocean. Aircraft are quickly deployed to airbases, and a Marine division is readied to invade Cuba, but it will take several days to prepare Army divisions for an amphibious and airborne assault. One should not be in a hurry to invade another country. These things often don't end well.
Seeing the U.S. mobilize and fearing an American surprise attack, Moscow orders mobilization of the Warsaw Pact.
October 19. That was a Friday, wasn't it? We should have been looking forward to the weekend, not war. While its forces mobilize, Washington intensifies paramilitary operations with the Operation Mongoose card, which disrupts Cuban defenses.
Now Moscow crosses the Rubicon. It plays Air Alert card, which allows air defenses to fire on American aircraft. A U-2 spy plane is shot down that day.
October 20. Infuriated by the loss of the U-2, the Americans go to Defcon 2 and declare a naval quarantine of Cuba. A Soviet convoy is stopped and inspected for missiles, but none are discovered.
The Soviets respond by stationing missile-armed submarines off the East coast.
October 21. Washington declares that its aircraft will attack any SAM site that fires on U.S. planes. Perhaps someone forgot to tell the Soviet air defense crews, because they do fire on a U-2, and are bombed for their pains.
But someone also forgot to tell the Americans that Cuba wasn't the only battleground. Moscow plays the Blockade Berlin card.
Dusk is falling. I have little fuel left for my lantern. We must hurry.
October 22. And so it begins. Four MRBM sites and an IRBM site have been detected so far. The Americans gamble that the nuclear missiles in Cuba will become operational soon. They play the Surgical Strike card, which allows airstrikes against nuclear missile sites. Two MRBM sites and an IRBM location are destroyed by Air Force and Navy aircraft.
But if America can attack their missiles, they can attack ours. The Soviets raise their alert level to War status, and Soviet bombers strike Jupiter missile sites in Turkey.
October 23. There were options, you know. There are always options. Look at the event cards. The Americans could have played gone to the United Nations, pledged not to invade Cuba, agreed not to place any missiles in Turkey. The Soviets could have withdrawn their missiles, or stopped sending convoys. But both sides were drunk on a cocktail of pride and fear. Perhaps the lesson is, don't drink with your finger on the nuclear button.
That day, the United States went to Defcon 1 and invaded Cuba. Marines and paratroopers landed near Havana. Within hours, the Soviets invaded Western Europe. And then there was only one last card to be played: Initiate Nuclear Warfare. Whether it was America or Russia who first played it doesn't matter. The results were the same.
Who won the war? Look around you. Do these ruins look like victory?
Go to sleep. You must rest before your long journey home.

Why Is Qatar Mucking Around in Gaza? - By David B. Roberts | Foreign Policy

Why Is Qatar Mucking Around in Gaza? - By David B. Roberts | Foreign Policy

Why Is Qatar Mucking Around in Gaza?

Doha's meddling in Palestinian affairs is much more about Iran than it is about Israel.

BY DAVID B. ROBERTS | OCTOBER 25, 2012

A deeply contrarian streak has taken hold in Qatar these days. Insulated by U.S. security guarantees, eager to use its burgeoning fiscal reserves, and propelled by its elites' reformist zeal, Doha continues to exert a disproportionate influence on regional politics. Emir Hamad bin Khalifah Al Thani's latest move was a dramatic visit to the Gaza Strip, becoming the first head of state to visit the Palestinian territory since Hamas wrested control of it in 2007.

Unlike some of its less imaginative Arab rivals, Qatar saw Hamas's regional isolation as an opportunity rather than a problem. Despite its alliance with the United States, Doha has been nurturing its ties with the Palestinian Islamist group for some time: Its worst kept secret is that Khaled Meshal, Hamas's leader, has had a house there for many years and has been increasingly seen in Doha since Hamas was forced to leave Syria in early 2012. Doha has also opened its pocketbook to Hamas, pledging $250 million in February -- a gift that was increased to $400 million upon the emir's visit.
The injection of funds, however, is not the most important aspect of Sheikh Hamad's trip. By breaking Hamas's regional isolation and explicitly recognizing its rule over Gaza, Doha has strengthened the militant group's hand against its Palestinian rivals. An official from the Palestinian Authority, which is in charge of the West Bank, begrudgingly welcomed the visit while noting that "no one should deal with Gaza as a separate entity from the Palestinian territories and from the Palestinian Authority."
Unlike the Palestinian Authority, Israel felt no need to soften its criticism. An Israeli spokesman carped bitterly about the emir's trip, saying that the emir was "throwing peace under a bus."
The visit further highlights Israel's loss of influence with Qatar. Relations between the two countries warmed with the opening of an Israeli trade office in Doha in 1996 (reputedly close to Meshal's house) as the two sides looked to ship Qatari gas to Israel, with Enron acting as the intermediary. The deal failed, however, and relations ebbed and flowed until December 2008, when Qatar cut ties in protest of Israel's offensive against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Rumors that Doha was attempting to restart relations were finally put to rest with a leaked memo from Israel's Foreign Ministry labelling Qatar as a "leading activist" against Israel, decisively cutting whatever informal relations remained.
The Iranian angle
Iran, with whom Qatar maintains cordial official relations, joins Israel and the Palestinian Authority in an unlikely triumvirate watching proceedings in Gaza with glum resignation. Tehran officials are doubtlessly looking back nostalgically to happier times only a few years back, when their proxy Hezbollah all but defeated the Zionist Entity -- winning Iran no small degree of Arab support for its material support to the Lebanese militant organization. Back then, Hamas was also still ensconced in Iran's camp, and Syria was a stable ally that appeared to be gradually increasing its influence in the Middle East.
Indeed, while Israel and the Palestinian Authority may view Qatar's embrace of Hamas with chagrin, it is Iran that is the central loser in this drama. The emir's visit is part of a larger Qatari policy to unseat and reorient crucial Iranian allies around the Middle East -- and by extension, amputate a long-used, effective limb of Iranian foreign policy. This is a remarkably forthright policy, for Iran will not -- and cannot -- take it lying down.
This new policy is most evident in Syria, where Qatar is explicitly and unashamedly supporting the 19-month insurgency with money, equipment, and at the very least light weaponry -- little less than a declaration of war against President Bashar al-Assad, Iran's core ally.
But Qatar's new activism is also apparent in Gaza, where Doha has likely decided to take action precisely because of Hamas's break from Iran. When Tehran stopped sending money to Hamas after the group failed to publically support Iran's embattled ally in Syria, Qatar saw an opportunity to split the Palestinian group from its long-time sponsor. While its $400 million donation is earmarked for humanitarian development, not only is such support fungible, but there are doubtless other financial arrangements being made between Qatar and Hamas on this trip -- further strengthening the ties between the Palestinian Islamist movement and Doha.
This move will, of course, catalyze another round of speculation that Qatar is supporting the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood across the Arab world. That Qatar's supports the Brotherhood is not in doubt -- indeed, it hardly tries to conceal its efforts at engaging with the Islamist movement in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria and now with Hamas, another Brotherhood offshoot. Yet Qatar is not nefariously trying to replace the Shia Crescent with a Brotherhood Banana, curving from Syria through Gaza, Egypt, and on to Libya and Tunisia. Doha is much more pragmatic and less Machiavellian than that: It is leveraging its relations where they exist, and looking to bolster popular, effective, moderate Muslim parties with whom it has relations.
Qatar's vanguard role in weakening a key plank of Iranian foreign policy indicates that Doha must feel deeply secure with its relationship with Tehran, for it would hardly undertake such aggressive moves if it felt imminently threatened. Indeed, there is an obvious flashpoint between the two regional powers: Qatar and Iran share the world's largest gas field, which has been responsible for Qatar's recent spike in wealth. Traditionally, this has meant that Qatar treated Iran with a great deal of respect. Relations were carefully improved in the 1990s as the field was being developed, as Doha sought to avoid an escalation after numerous instances of Iran attacking and stealing equipment from unmanned Qatari gas rigs.
Today, Qatar's relations with Iran are as pleasant as ever on the surface. However, the fact that Qatar is overturning one of the key tenets of its foreign policy by antagonizing Iran is a surprising and forthright move by the Qatari elite, which clearly does not accept conventional limits on what is and what is not possible in the Middle East.

Essentials of Financial Management and Communication (4 days) | ReliefWeb

Essentials of Financial Management and Communication (4 days) | ReliefWeb

Switzerland

Essentials of Financial Management and Communication (4 days)

Training

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Registration deadline:  20 Nov 2012

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Training date:  27 Nov 2012 to 30 Nov 2012

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NGO Management School

Using financial skills to maximise organisational and programme impact

Registration and course fees
Registration and payment deadline: 20 November 2012. Early bird fee available for payments until 27 September 2012.
Early bird fee/ Full fee:

• Non-OECD: CHF 1150 / 1320
• OECD: CHF 1340 / 1560

Online currency converter: CHF to USD CHF to EUR CHF to GBP. These are indicative rates, provided by XE Currency Converter.
10% discount for returning students (within 12 months since the last course) or additional course participants from same organisation.
To register, please fill in the online registration form, or download the form and send it to us by email. For further inquiries, please contact us.
Course overview
Click here to download the course leaflet (PDF format).
The four-day course Essentials of financial management and communication is aimed at equipping NGO directors, managers, programme staff, fundraisers and other non-finance people. Whether working in a head office or internationally, it provides the knowledge and skills to effectively and efficiently manage financial resources.
Participants will learn the basics of financial management within a non-profit setting, including planning and monitoring budgets, using financial information to make the most of their resources, strategic financial management, and managing finance effectively to maximise organisational and programme impact. The course also shows how to achieve strong financial communication with management committee members, donors, partners and other stakeholders to optimise your work.
In this participatory workshop participants will learn to confidently use the skills which provide a working knowledge of finance and financial management. The workshop will include a balance of short inputs, discussion, group work and individual activities. There will be lots of opportunities to ask questions. The course is not only about learning financial skills but planning how to use them to help your organisation flourish.
Who should attend
It is for anyone needing to communicate financial information, and/or structure their organisation to make sure this happens. It would be particularly appropriate for finance staff, programme staff, managers and heads of organisations, and fundraisers – whether working nationally or internationally. It will be helpful for those who recognise their need to communicate more effectively about finance, and those wanting an insight into how finance people communicate.
How you and your organisation will benefit - Learning Objectives
By the end of this course, participants will be able to:

• use financial management to build an organisation’s capacity
• manage budget processes and cash flow and develop the building blocks for financial systems
• evaluate financial information to help become more sustainable
• apply basic financial controls to minimise the risks of errors and theft
• advise a partner on the appropriate timing of individual financial interventions
• recognise cultural differences between ‘finance’ and ‘non-finance’ people, and how to communicate effectively when working cross-culturally
• communicate clearly about financial topics using practical skills

Course programme

DAY 1	Welcome Financial management Financial management requirements in non-profit organisations Financial and management accounting Financial management: a means to an end Finance planning and budgeting Ground rules and costing principles Budgeting case study Funding grids, monitoring and managing cash flow
DAY 2	Financial systems Building blocks of NGO financial records Making full use of financial systems as a non-finance person Underlying principles that only accountants know – until now! Financial statements and evaluation Financial statements: what do they mean and how are they used Evaluating financial information Reviewing financial statements and using them to build capacity
DAY 3	Strategic financial management Sustainably managing ‘reserves’ Strategies for funding and allocating overheads Checklist of keeping financial control: recognising danger signals of fraud Building financial capacity Financial capacity case study Practical tips to build financial capacity Improving financial management and programmeffectiveness
DAY 4	Finance and non-finance communication Different work cultures and understanding each other What finance and non-finance people say about each other Tips for improving relationship International variations Working in inter-cultural situations Practical solutions to communicating finance inter-culturally Strategies for improving relationships and programmes Action planning and course evaluation

Individual consultation
As a participant, you can obtain an individual consultation from the trainer during the course on how to further develop a project for your own organisation, or on another subject perhaps relating to a partner organisation.

Training ID: #443123

Career categories:

• Administration/HR
• Finance/Accounting/Auditing
• Management

Country:

• Switzerland

City:

• Geneva

Organisation:

• NGO Management School

Theme:

• Education

Language:

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Online Certificate Course on Gender-based Violence Training | ReliefWeb

Online Certificate Course on Gender-based Violence Training | ReliefWeb

World

Online Certificate Course on Gender-based Violence Training

Training

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Registration deadline:  16 Nov 2012

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Training date:  20 Nov 2012 to 14 Dec 2012

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Human Rights & Justice Group International

Download DOC (67 KB)

Course Description:
Gender-based violence (GBV) has been recognized as a cross-cutting issue affecting the lives of victims from a diversity of dimensions including culture, education, health, economy, psychology, livelihoods and political participation. In fact, violence against women and girls was chosen as one of the critical areas of action following the Beijing Conference. This presents a key opportunity for different players, including government agencies, NGOs, United Nations agencies and other institutions, to build an understanding on issues of violence and undertake activities to combat violence. This online course is imperative to build this understanding and initiate and strengthen programmes combating gender-based violence.
This course is aimed at building the capacity and commitment of participants to undertake programs targeted at eradicating gender-based violence and to develop a new movement for gender equality.
The course also features a number of exercises and reflective activities designed to examine the concepts of gender, gender-based violence, sexuality, and rights. It will further explore the impact of gender-based violence on education, health and development.
Benefits: The overall purpose of the training programme is to increase participant’s knowledge and understanding of the concept of gender, and gender-based violence, sexuality, and rights. It will further take a look at the various forms of gender-based violence and the core principles for a code of conduct, reporting mechanisms and developing a programmatic response.
Course Content: This 5-weeks part-time course comprises 6 modules. The module outline is included below:
PRE – Training (Free) -Introductory Course in the Online Training System -Course navigation and guide -Explanation of course resources
Module 1: Introduction to Gender -Understanding the importance of gender -What is gender? -The concept of gender, development and Violence -Gender and socialization (Social construction of gender) -Basic gender concepts and terminology -Review of Module 1 & Evaluation
Module 2: Gender-based Violence -Introduction to gender-based violence -The concept of violence -Types of Gender-based violence -The relationship between gender, development and violence -Gender-based violence from a human rights perspective -Review of Module 2 & Evaluation
Module 3: Gender Analysis -Understanding gender analysis -Key elements of gender analysis -Gender analysis using the Life Cycle Framework of Analysis with focus on GBV -Review of Module 3 & Evaluation
Module 4: Gender Mainstreaming -What is Gender Mainstreaming? -Historic Overview of Gender Mainstreaming -The Concept of Gender Mainstreaming -The Role of Men in Gender Mainstreaming -Gender Mainstreaming in Specific Sectors (E.g. Agriculture, Health, Education etc.) -Gender Mainstreaming and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) -Gender Mainstreaming Best practices -Review of Module 4 & Evaluation
Module 5: Action Against Gender-based Violence -Ways of Combating Gender-based Violence -Addressing GBV practices -Advocacy, negotiation, and communication skills -Existing national and institutional action to combat gender-based violence -The role of UN and inter-government institutions in combating GBV -Country level case study -Review of Module 5 & Evaluation
Module 6: International Legal Human Rights Instruments Related to GBV -The Universal Declaration of Human Rights -Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) -The Bill of Rights -The European Convention on Human Rights -The Beijing Declaration & Program of Action -The African Charter on Human & Peoples’ Rights -The Convention on the Rights of the Child -Review of Module 6 & Evaluation
Module 7: Conclusion and Wrap-up -General Course Review -Final Examination -Participants Evaluation of Course/Feedback -Conclusion
Additional Features • Online, interactive, self-paced and self-learning modules. • Surveys and tests to test your knowledge and understanding before and after the test. • Opportunity to post comments, assignment answers, live chat, and blogging etc.
Target Audience This course is designed for gender focal points, programme managers and professional responsible for developing and implementing interventions aimed at combating gender-based violence or promoting gender equality. They include researchers, policy-makers, activists, women advocates and feminists, students, staff of NGOs and CBOs, staff of UN specialized agencies, donor agency field workers, volunteers, development actors, trainers, students, government officials etc.
Entry Requirement: Students must have a current e-mail account, regular access to and general familiarity with the internet and mobile phones. Candidates should have a good written command of English language and high competence and comfort with computer and internet use.
Course Delivery: Interaction with students will be via the Global Human Rights Leadership Training Institute training platform and all course notes and guidelines for study will be delivered and accessible to students in electronic format. (http://www.justicegroup.us/GHRLTI)
Each week a new module is available to the students. At the end of each week, an assignment is completed by the students and marked by the course experts. Assignments are in the form of written assignments.
Award of the Certificates: Statistics from previous courses showed that submission of assignments and receiving online tutoring help participants to integrate gender in their various activities. Certificates can be awarded only to those students who: 1) Completed all assignments and Final Exam 2) Obtain a combined final mark of 50% or more for the assignments and Final Exam
Successful students will receive the GHRLTI Certificate in Gender-based Violence Training.
Course Fee: The course tuition fee is US$300. Course fees include access to all course materials, expert support, assignments as well as postage and packaging of a certificate. There is a limited amount of partial scholarships available for applicants from developing countries, based on financial need.
Location: Online Total Duration: 4 weeks, approximately 25 hours learning time
Application Procedure: However, applications will be accepted on a first-come-first-serve basis. Applications received after this deadline will not be considered. You can also download application form at http://www.justicegroup.us/gender-development.
Inquiries about the course may be sent to: applications@justicegroup.org
GHRLTI Human Rights and Justice Group Int’l Nigeria: 53, Western Avenue, P.O.Box 3326, Surulere, 101014, Lagos, Nigeria Tel: +234-8034923400, 08097627319 U.S.A.: 1208 Massachusetts Ave., Suite 4, 2nd Floor, Cambridge, MA 02138 E-mail: info@justicegroup.org |Website: http://www.justicegroup.us

Online Advance Certificate Course on Project Management

Online Advance Certificate Course on Project Management | ReliefWeb

World

Online Advance Certificate Course on Project Management

Training

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Registration deadline:  06 Nov 2012

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Training date:  08 Nov 2012 to 30 Nov 2012

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Human Rights & Justice Group International

Download DOC (63 KB)

COURSE DESCRIPTION:
The future of many organisations depends on their ability to manage projects, programs, and portfolios of projects. Skills in these areas continue to be in high demand. Have you ever been involved in a complex project that just did not go the way you wanted? Often failure is pre ordained due to the approach to the project. The concept of project management exists because it helps assure completion of a project successfully.
To help the project manager succeed in achieving their objectives, it is essential that all members of his/her team become aware of and use sound project management practices. This course is designed to provide participants with the rudimentary knowledge and skills that will enable them to support the planning, implementation, and monitoring requirements of their projects. It is intended to give participants an appreciation of the types and quantity of data that project managers require in order to keep a project within the confines of the triple constraints.
Key Outcomes: Upon completion of this course, participants will be able to:
a) Demonstrate an understanding of everyday project management terminology. b). Contribute to the presentation of an effective project kick-off meeting. c) Develop a more accurate schedule for their project activities. d) Contribute to the development of a project risk management plan. e) Participate in the development of accurate scope, cost, and schedule baselines. f) Implement effective scope, cost, and schedule tracking and monitoring processes. g) Contribute to the effective closeout of their project.
COURSE OUTLINE
Pre-Training:
Introductory Course in the Online Training System (Free)
Module 1: PHASE 1 --- Project Definition
Section 1: Introduction to Project Management Introduction Historical overview of project management Assignment
Section 2: Defining your project Project definition Project management as a concept Project life cycle Organizational structure Assignment
Module 2: PHASE 2 --- Project Initiation and Planning
Section 3: Project Planning Project selection/identifying stakeholders -Preparing a stakeholder analysis -Sample stakeholder Analysis Creating a project charter -Elements of a project charter -Sample project charter
Project proposal – definition and preparation Developing a preliminary scope statement -Content of a scope statement -Scope statement and GSMART objectives -Sample preliminary scope statement
Develop project management plan Assignment
Section 4: The Triple Constraint and Project Planning The concept of the Triple Constraint The difference between time estimates: effort, duration, and calendar Assignment
Section 5: Project Budgeting Budgeting in project management Cost estimating Cost budgeting (Direct and Indirect costing) Project schedule and cost baselines Personnel budgeting Assignment
Section 6: Understanding Project Risk Management Planning
Risk management plans -Sample risk management plan -Probability/impact matrices
The three components of risks Six steps of the risk management process Approaches to risk monitoring and control Risk response strategies
Risk Register -Sample risk register Assignment
Module 3: PHASE 3 --- Project Execution
Section 7: Project Execution Introduction Executing tasks for project integration management -Deliverables -Sample deliverables -Work performance information Executing tasks for project quality management Executing tasks for project human resource management Introduction to team management -Developing the project team and assessing team performance -Basic team management practices Communication in Project management -Important project communication concepts -Basic communication models Assignment
Module 4: PHASE 4 --- Project Monitoring, Evaluation & Adjustment
Section 8: Project Monitoring and Evaluation The concept of monitoring and evaluation The Importance of monitoring a project Project adjustment Assignment
Module 5: PHASE 5 --- Project Completion & Final Evaluation
Section 9: Complete and Best Practices Introduction Closing tasks for project integration management Best Practices -Organizational project management maturity model (OPM3) best practices Final/Overall Project Evaluation Summary of Project Management
CONCLUSION Final Examination Participants Evaluation of Course/Feedback Conclusion
COURSE REQUIREMENTS: This is an online course, so you'll need to have a computer with an Internet connection, and you'll need a web-browser (you can use IE or FireFox). All the course materials you'll need to complete this course are provided in the course modules. You will not need to purchase any additional materials, resources, or books. You will also have the opportunity of experiencing the best online training platform.
ADDITIONAL FEATURES: • Online, interactive, self-paced and self-learning modules. • Assignments to test your knowledge and understanding before and after the course. • Opportunity to post comments, assignment answers, live chat and blogging etc.
TARGET AUDIENCE: Candidates should have a good written command of English language and good competence and comfort with computer and internet use.
COST: The course tuition fee is US$300. There is a limited amount of partial scholarships available for this course for applicants from developing countries, based on financial need.
LOCATION: Online
APPLICATION PROCEDURE: Registration is on a first come, first served basis. However, applications will be accepted on a first-come-first-serve basis. To download the application form, visit our website at http://www.justicegroup.us/advanced-project-management. Register early for this wonderful learning opportunity!
Further inquiries about the course may be sent to: applications@justicegroup.org
GHRLTI Human Rights and Justice Group Int’l Nigeria: 53, Western Avenue, P.O.Box 3326, Surulere, 101014, Lagos, Nigeria Tel: +234-8034923400 U.S.A.: 1208 Massachusetts Ave., Suite 4, 2nd Floor, Cambridge, MA 02138 E-mail: info@justicegroup.org |Website: http://www.justicegroup.us

Media and elections: Who cares whether momentum is or isn't real? | The Economist

Media and elections: Who cares whether momentum is or isn't real? | The Economist

Democracy in America

American politics

Media and elections

Who cares whether momentum is or isn't real?

Oct 26th 2012, 18:48 by M.S.

EFFORTS by Mitt Romney's campaign to claim that he has the momentum, and corresponding reports in some media, have occasioned pushback from political scientists and others who think there is no such thing as momentum in a two-candidate race. Nate Silver writes: "In races for the United States Senate, for instance, my research suggests that a candidate who gains ground in the polls in one month (say, from August to September) is no more likely to do so during the next one (from September to October). If anything, the candidate who gains ground in the polls in one month may be more likely to lose ground the next time around." Jonathan Bernstein writes that momentum is "just a term campaigns use to excite their partisans and to fool gullible reporters into writing stories that create the illusion of momentum that never existed in the first place." John Sides notes Politico reporters first writing that Mr Romney has the momentum and then walking it back, and says journalists need to make sure they're pegging reporting to data rather than creating false narratives:

When you can’t peg your analysis to any consistent metrics, you end up veering all over the place following the well-known incentive to write interesting stories. On Monday, OBAMA SURGES. On Tuesday, ROMNEY SURGES. Other media repeat the same story because pack journalism lives. And so on. In reality, nothing changed and the polling fluctuations are just sampling error.

The question I have is: if there is no such thing as momentum, why does it matter whether or not candidates claim they have momentum? If making it public that your candidate has been gaining vote share (ie "has momentum") does not produce a positive feedback loop of yet more vote share, then whether or not campaigns or the press declare a candidate has momentum should make no difference. It's a question of intellectual interest for those interested in knowing the truth of the matter at this particular moment. But in a couple of weeks we will all know who actually won the 2012 presidential election, and whether or not you were right on October 26th that the Romney campaign was going to continue to gain vote share on October 27th will be a rather trivial issue. If you believe momentum does not exist, you should be uninterested in whether or not candidates are said to have it, since that claim cannot influence voters.
But I don't really think that Messrs Silver, Bernstein and Sides are indifferent to whether or not Politico writes that a campaign has "momentum". I think they believe that press treatment of whether or not campaigns are rising can create feedback loops to some extent. Mr Bernstein, for example, explains his thinking (my bold):

(S)hifts happen when the information environment strongly favors one candidate or the other—such as when a party’s (successful) convention is running, or if a candidate is perceived to have decisively won a debate. The key thing, then, is that "momentum" is only likely to last as long as information favoring one candidate continues to dominate the news. And that almost never happens, because the press usually wants to move on to a new story.

I think it's pretty clear that when the press is saying a candidate "has the momentum", that counts as a favourable information environment. You can dispute how strong an effect this storyline has, as compared to event-driven storylines such as debates, speeches, economic plans, gaffes, terrorist attacks and what have you. But to the extent that the press concentrates on horse-race reporting, who has "momentum" really becomes the story. And it seems to me that in the final two weeks of the campaign, the horse-race reporting starts to dominate the campaign news. People are less and less interested in reading again about whether Mitt Romney's tax plan is mathematically impossible, and more and more interested in reading about whether he has any way to win Ohio.
This certainly creates a debilitating feedback loop, in that the press to some extent determines the media environment which then moves the poll numbers that it reports on. So you could blame the press for feeding this recursivity. On the other hand, voters are just as much to blame. Why do voters all want to read about how many voters are going to vote one way or another? Shouldn't they concentrate on reading about the candidates and their campaigns, and then vote based on their own judgment? Why do they not only allow themselves to be influenced by the choice percentages of fellow voters, but actively seek out and prefer articles about what percentage of other voters are going to vote for whom, rather than articles about the candidates, parties and policies they're about to choose between?
I don't know. People are weird. That said, it seems to me that Mr Bernstein is right to propose that both voters and the media should understand the phenomenon of "momentum" as an effect created by the media itself. It would be more accurate for reporters to write: "Mitt Romney's numbers jumped steadily in the polls after he won the first debate. The favourable coverage from those rising poll numbers may itself continue to win over more voters, unless something happens that leads the press to tack its coverage in the other direction." But it seems unlikely that reporters will ever write this way. On related lines, I think Alec MacGillis is exactly right that the media's chief difficulty in reporting the "truth" is that the media has an overwhelming interest in writing things that are interesting, and more specifically in collaborating to create a joint campaign narrative that structures the themes we can then play off to interest the audience. You know that Adam Smith line about members of the same profession never gathering together but it results in a conspiracy against the public interest? Well, every single time anybody in the media writes anything, we're "gathering together" in a joint conversation to produce a national political narrative, which also happens to be what we make our money off of. And whether or not that conversation is structured in a manner that serves the public interest, as opposed to the interest of harvesting the dwindling advertising revenues that sustain our business model, is often rather doubtful.

China's ruling families Torrent of scandal: The Economist

http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2012/10/chinas-ruling-families?fsrc=nlw|newe|10-26-2012|3939022|106923250|AP

China's ruling families

Torrent of scandal

Oct 26th 2012, 6:28 by J.M. | BEIJING

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AT HIS first news conference as China’s prime minister, Wen Jiabao introduced himself to reporters packed into a cavernous room in the Great Hall of the People (as well as to a live television audience) with an unusual reference to his own family history. Chinese leaders normally hide behind the smokescreen of “collective leadership”, downplaying their own attributes. But Mr Wen waxed lyrical about his own upbringing: “I am a very ordinary person. I come from a family of teachers in the countryside. My grandfather, my father and my mother were all teachers. My childhood was spent in the turmoil of war. Our home was literally burnt down by the flame of war and so was the primary school, which my grandfather built with his own hands. The untold suffering in the days of old China left an indelible imprint on my tender mind.”
As a tour de force of investigative reporting by the New York Times now reveals, Mr Wen’s family circumstances have changed a lot since those days. It says that the prime minister’s relatives, including his wife, have controlled assets worth at least $2.7 billion. It notes that Mr Wen has “broad authority” over the major industries where his relatives have made their fortunes. Their business dealings have sometimes been hidden in ways that suggest the relatives are eager to avoid public scrutiny, says the report.
That family members of China’s most powerful politicians cash in on their connections comes as no surprise. Over the past two decades, as the country’s economy has ballooned, rumours and occasional bits of evidence of such behaviour have accumulated at a similar pace. In June Bloomberg shed remarkable light on the fortunes of relatives of Xi Jinping, the man who next month will be appointed general secretary of the Communist Party and, in March, president of China. Chinese officials were deeply unhappy with that report: Bloomberg’s entire website has been blocked in China ever since (as has the Analects story about the Bloomberg report). In the few hours since its exposé of Mr Wen’s family appeared, the New York Times’s website has been subjected to the same treatment (ironically, given Mr Wen’s avowed support for “people’s rights to stay informed about, participate in, express views on and oversee government affairs”: see his speech to the National People's Congress (NPC), the country’s legislature, in March).
Mr Wen and his fellow leaders would prefer any public attention to the business dealings of the powerful to be focused on the family of Bo Xilai, the former party chief of Chongqing region in the south-west. Coincidentally, just after publication of the New York Times story, it was announced that Mr Bo had been expelled from the NPC. This was hardly a shock given that he had already been stripped of every other title, including last month his membership of the party. It prepares the way, however, for Mr Bo to be put on trial (NPC membership confers a token immunity from prosecution). This event will likely be staged some time in the next few months and will be the most sensational of its kind involving a deposed Chinese leader since the trial of the “Gang of Four” in 1980. Managing news coverage of it will be a huge challenge to the “collective leadership”. It will want to convince the public that Mr Bo and family members were engaged in egregious corruption (not least in order to block any possibility of a political comeback by the ambitious Mr Bo). But it will not want gossip to spread about the business affairs of other ruling families (squirrelling money abroad appears a national pastime, as we explain in our China section this week).
The man all but certain to succeed Mr Wen next March, his deputy, Li Keqiang, will be among those squirming. In a powerful report just published, Cheng Li of the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, has exposed the prominent role of Li Keqiang’s younger brother, Li Keming, in the tobacco industry—even as Li Keqiang has been overseeing reform of the health sector. Airing such conflicts of interest is taboo in the Chinese press.
Our cover this week calls Mr Xi “The man who must change China”. Revelations such as those by the New York Times, Bloomberg and Brookings strengthen the case for this. As we argue in a leader, Mr Xi needs to venture deep into political reform, including setting a timetable for the direct election of government leaders as Deng Xiaoping once suggested should be possible. Our Banyan column explains why Chinese-style “meritocracy” is not enough to prevent the kind of abuses of power that are rife in China today. And in a three-page briefing we look at how Mr Xi is being assailed from all sides by demands for far-reaching change.
(Picture credit: EPA)

« China's leadership transition: A troubled inheritance

Interview between Efraim Halevy and Aaron David Miller (Former Director Mossad) | Wilson Center

Interview between Efraim Halevy and Aaron David Miller | Wilson Center

Interview between Efraim Halevy and Aaron David Miller

Oct 24, 2012

Efraim Halevy is a former Director of Mossad and former Head of the Israeli National Security Council. Aaron David Miller is the Vice President for New Initiatives at the Woodrow Wilson Center. The interview took place following the October 18 meeting “Iran, Palestine, and the Arab Spring: The View from Israel” at the Wilson Center.

1. Is Iran with a nuclear weapon an existential threat to Israel?

I object to the use of the term [existential] for several reasons. First of all, I am convinced that Israel is here to stay. I know we're going to stay here for the next couple of thousand years at least and after that we can meet and talk. It's not just a question of semi-religious or mythological belief.
I believe that Israel is a strong country. I was there when Israel came to being in 1948. I was then a teenager. My family and I immigrated to what was then Palestine in April 1948. I was a witness of independence. I was old enough to understand what was going on and to follow it very closely, and I heard the roar of the Iraqis’ artillery as they were shooting targets not far from where I was temporarily living in Netanya which is on the coast. I was going to come up to Jerusalem where I had some family, but this was not possible because Jerusalem was under siege.
And this is a war in which there were many, many casualties and many, many had fallen during battle. We suffered since 6,000 men and women were killed in battle which was 1 percent of the population, the Jewish population, so a very large number. And there were days in which hundreds of people were killed in battle. And I do not believe that it is possible to see the demise of the state of Israel. I think we have sufficient power and capabilities to deal with any threats of any kind.
Now, I also object to the use of this term because I believe it is a fatal mistake to say publically that there is an existential threat because it means that if the Iranians, by one way or another obtain such a capability, you begin a countdown to the end of the civil Israel, and I think this is something which is unconscionable.
And the third point is I think there is a terrible mistake to tell you or mark the enemy that he has in his power to destroy you and to put you out of your existence. This, I think, is wrong tactically, it's wrong strategically, and it's wrong professionally to come publically to the Iranians and say, "Look, you are an existential threat to me." This only calls them into trying to prove that what you say about yourself is true. If you say that the other side is capable of emerging as existential threat and the other side will say—if they believe that they can—put us out of business then we should really try and do so. So from every point I think it's a terrible mistake to use this.

2. If negotiations pursued in a positive and well-intentioned manner and sanctions do not deter the Iranians from continuing their quest for a nuclear, are any circumstances under which you would be willing to entertain or consider military action?

Yes, I believe that if all other means had been totally exhausted. If we had followed all the other avenues to try to persuade the Iranians from doing what obviously they're still trying to do then I believe it is not only acceptable, it's also I think logical that one should take, military means in order to get this capability removed. I say removed but I don't believe that it will be removed. I mean it will be delayed. And I think that delay is important because in history time is of the essence, in both ways, it's time is of the essence in order to do the right thing at the right time and not to wait. Also time is of the essence because time gives you the breathing space sometimes to develop other possibilities which would negate the capability which is now in front of you.
So I think yes it is right to use a capability you have in order to delay the Iranian nuclear program. Now, I believe that if we are looking for the best way of doing it, I think that the United States has far beyond Israel the capabilities of causing and affecting on the Iranians such damage as to prolong this period. I think that if Israel did it, it would be a shorter period of time, and if the United States would do it, it would be a much longer period of time. That's why I believe that a major priority would be to get the United States to agree to take, how shall I put it, this task upon itself.

3. Is Iran, in your judgment, a rational actor?

I think that yes, I think the Iranians are rational. I think at this particular point in time they are focused on trying to inflict upon Israel major damage. I think maybe they believe that they do have in their power to put Israel out of business and to remove Israel from the face of the earth. And I think that if they really believe that they could do it and they have the means to do it, one has to assume that they might actually use these means. I don't believe that once they have the means, they will not use it.
But I think that there are three things which have to be taken into account in this area. One is that they are persistently saying that it's against their religion to have such a capability. Two, if they develop such a capability they will in fact be saying that they've been lying not only about what they've been doing, they'll be lying as to what their real beliefs are. And three, that is of a serious matter for a religious person to say and to do, and, therefore, I think it's not an easy thing for them to go about this and do it in that way.

4. I know you're an analyst and not a fortune teller. But will 2013 in your judgment be a determinative point in this process? Will the issue of the nuclear--of Iranian nuclear weapons program either be joined in war and/or diplomacy or might we find ourselves at the end of 2013 where we are now?

I think 2013 is a decisive point in history, a point in time. I think that there is time now to energetically engage in trying to find a solution which is other than a military one. I think that there’s much that can be done or should be done. And I think of course, as I said, that if all other options are exhausted and have been unsuccessful, yes, and maybe 2013 will be a time when Israel and/or the United States will take action.

5. Why don't we have a conflict-ending agreement between Israelis and Palestinians?

 I can give a long dissertation as to why we don't have it. But I think I'd like to focus on the immediate. And I'd say at that this particular point in time, this is not a viable possibility. It's not viable because I think the Palestinians don't have their act together. They’re divided both geographically and politically. I think anybody who signed such an agreement would not have a real mandate to sign it. And even if he believes he has, he will not have the capability to implement it, certainly not in the Gaza Strip.
And therefore, an agreement of such nature will be a misleading agreement. It will create the notion that an agreement has been reached and it is a serious event in history, when in actual fact it's going to be something much worse than just a non-event. It will be an act of, how should I put it, of hypocrisy, of the worst particular kind. And therefore that's one reason I think there is another possibility.
I also think that the present make up of this Israeli political scene is such that there is no majority in place either in government or in the nation for reaching an agreement with the Palestinians. One because people enjoy life the way it is and they say why take the risks, why move to something which is going to be very painful and which is going to have a lot of repercussions internally? And 300,000 people or so will have to be removed, or 100,000 people will have to be removed, and there are very, very bitter memories of what happened during the Gaza disengagement, and that's already 10,000 people.
And therefore, public opinion will not support this in Israel, at the moment and as far as the political scene is concerned, I don't think that the upcoming elections in Israel are going to produce a result which will make it easier. It will probably make it more difficult, because as the time we are talking now on this, there would have to be a big change in the opposition to the Netanyahu government which does not seem to be in the cards. I think the general trend in Israel today will be towards the more extremist approach rather than the less extremist approach to an agreement with the Palestinians.

6. And what are the consequences of no agreement?  Do you agree with  those who argue that demography and the absence of a solution will undermine the Jewish and democratic character of the state of Israel?

Yes I do. And I'm very concerned about that because I think that the “no solution” means that there's going to be a one state between the Mediterranean and the Jordan valley in which you'll have two distinct populations. One which will be a majority which is gradually decreasing and a minority which is gradually or not even gradually increasing, and, therefore, we will have a situation which between Jordan and the sea it'll be a democratic system for the minority and a non-democratic system for the majority, and this is unsustainable and untenable.
And it's the most likely solution at the moment and the least desirable. And therefore, I think that it'll be imperative for Israel to seek  some kind of understanding which would entail withdrawal from certain lands and handing them over to Palestinians. And Palestinians, in order to succeed, ultimately would have to get their act together in one way or another; and my guess is that it would not be the Fatah Movement which will be able to achieve this. Fatah today is a hollow movement. It's a movement which is gradually preparing to leave the historical scene.

7. Are you concerned about the viability of Egyptian-Israeli and Jordanian -Israeli relationships in the face of the political changes sweeping the Arab world?

I think so far the reaction from Egypt has been encouraging. This is not say that I'm happy with many of these statements coming from Cairo; but the most important are repeated statements by the Egyptian president and his representatives and advisors to the public that Egypt will abide by its international obligations.
I think the Egyptians are trying to get their act together. I think they're behaving responsibly. I don't think that they are enamored with Israel. They don't have to be. And I think that there's room for improvement here.
As far as Jordan is concerned, Jordan is now under extreme pressure. But I nevertheless believe that despite the fact that there are enormous pressures on Jordan today—particularly from the influx of refugees—with care, and understanding and wisdom, I'm hoping that King Abdullah will survive.

8. Does it matter to you whether there are Islamists, democrats or dictators, in power in the Arab world?

I would put it this way, since I don't think we have it in our capacity to influence what is going to happen in states other than our own, and since if that is the will of the people around us, there is nothing that we could do about it. We have to find ways and means of living with it. I think that's the way to look at it. And, therefore, I think we have to accept realities the way they are. That's why it was very encouraging several hours after President Morsi won the elections that prime minister Netanyahu sent a messaging saying, "I congratulate you on your success and I want to work together with you." I think that was a right thing to do.
I would much prefer that there will not be extreme Islamist regimes in those countries. But again there's nothing we can do about it. So, for us it's a test to find ways and means on how to live with them. And we have to work on it and find ways and means of doing it rather than simply throwing up our hands in despair saying, you know, now it's going to be very bad and then close the shutters and pray for supreme godly protection.

9. Where is Syria headed?

I think in the end there's a good chance that Syria will implode and disintegrate into small statelets. I don't think the Alawites are going to--just give up and go home. But there is also a possibility that once Assad is out of the way, other Alawites will come and find the modus operandi with whatever powers prevail.
What I am concerned about very much is the prospect of whether or not Iranians will be there once Assad is gone. And I believe it's a basic Israeli interest to do everything we can and to prevail upon everybody we can, to ensure that at the end of the day the Iranians are out of Syria.
And the last thing I'd like to say is this, I don't believe that there will be a religious regime in Syria, the kind which exists in Egypt. I think that is because the population  is composed of  Sunnis,  Alawites, Kurds,  Christians, and others  that I think that it's not possible to have a Muslim state in Syria, and it might very well be  some kind  of a  secular type.

10. Any thoughts on the US-Israel relationship and our upcoming elections?

Israeli-American relations have gone through several bumps. I think that basically they have been very good. I think on the practical side, the United States has been very supportive of Israel during the Obama administration. I think both financially and strategically, we have received a lot of support—support both in equipment and support in political moves like the way the United States has behaved at the UN Security Council and in the UN in general. And I think there should be a little less complaining about it on the part of Israel that the administration has not embraced us warmly. I think international relations is not a love fest in which you celebrate love and fondness. I think it has to be practical business. And Israel should not always pray and expect to be embraced and hugged and pacified and so forth. We're grown-ups and we should act as grown-ups.
Regarding the election, I think many of the statements made by the Republican candidate are very undesirable as far as Israel is concerned. I remember an article of Governor Romney’s in the Washington Post in March of this year in which he advocated the dispatch of American warships to the Eastern Mediterranean. I think shooting from the hip on these matters is a very dangerous sport to be engaged in. I think it should not be done.  And I think that drawing Israel into the campaign is detrimental to Israeli interests. And I regret that one of the candidates is doing this.

11. As a former intelligence officer, analyst, what do you think is the most important factor that a decision maker has to keep in mind in formulating policy?

I think that before decisions are made—strategic decisions, I'm not talking about tactical decisions—I think one has to take into account your capability of actually carrying out what it is you've decided. And this is something which at a political level, only the political master can do.  And you as an intelligence officer must give him the information or assessment of the situation. But you cannot determine for him what his capabilities are, because capabilities are not just counting the number of troops you have or the number of guns you have, or the number of aircraft. It's also the resilience of the people of a country as a whole and many other factors, that's number one.
Number two, I think it's very important not to be hooked up to a single option choice. I think it is imperative to present at a political level more than one option. It doesn't mean to say you can’t afterwards, express your preference one way or the other; but presenting one option to be linked up to one sole possibility, that's all. Take it or leave it. I think that's a mistake on the part of people who present options at a political level.
And the third thing is—and that I think I learned from Yitzhak Rabin—whatever you are pursuing, always prepare an alternative. Always, never be caught without an alternative. And juggle more than one ball in the air. Always have an alternative. Don't be left in the position where in case the initiative you have undertaken fails, you are left with an empty hand.